Competition, Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of Monopoly by Lee, Yoon-Ho Alex & Brown, Donald J.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
7-1-2005 
Competition, Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of Monopoly 
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee 
Donald J. Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee, Yoon-Ho Alex and Brown, Donald J., "Competition, Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of 
Monopoly" (2005). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1814. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1814 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 




COMPETITION, CONSUMER WELFARE, AND 






























COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 





Competition, Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of Monopoly 
 
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee† and Donald J. Brown‡ 
 
 
Conventional deadweight loss measures of the social cost of monopoly ignore, among other 
things, the social cost of inducing competition and thus cannot accurately capture the loss in 
social welfare. In this Article, we suggest an alternative method of measuring the social cost of 
monopoly. Using elements of general equilibrium theory, we propose a social cost metric where 
the benchmark is the Pareto optimal state of the economy that uses the least amount of resources, 
consistent with consumers’ utility levels in the monopolized state. If the primary goal of antitrust 
policy is the enhancement of consumer welfare, then the proper benchmark is Pareto optimality, 
not simply competitive markets. We discuss the implications of our approach for antitrust law as 
well as how our methodology can be used in practice for allegations of monopoly power given a 




 Monopoly and market power constitute the backbone of federal antitrust law.  The 
Sherman Act1—largely regarded as the origin of the federal antitrust law and passed in 
1890—was the government’s response to cartelization and monopolization.  Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act specifically prohibits monopolization as well as attempts to monopolize.  
In modern antitrust law, the existence of monopoly power is one of the two essential 
elements of the Grinnell test,2 a test that is applied in all Section 2 cases of the Sherman 
Act.3  Proof of market power is also required for antitrust violation under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.4  Judge Richard A. Posner argues that “the economic theory of monopoly 
provides the only sound basis for antitrust policy.”5  That antitrust scholars are mindful of 
the social cost of monopoly and market power is also illustrated, for instance, by Professor 
William M. Landes and Judge Posner’s remark that the size of the market should be a 
determinant factor in judging whether a certain degree of market power should be 
actionable under antitrust law.6  They note that “the actual economic injury caused to 
society is a function of [the size of the market]” and “[i]f the amount of economic activity 
is small, the total social loss is small, and an antitrust proceeding is unlikely to be socially 
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cost justified[.]”7  Accordingly, a clear understanding and a workable definition of the 
social cost of monopoly are essential in shaping and implementing antitrust law.   
 A familiar measure of the social cost of monopoly is the deadweight loss triangle—
the social surplus unrealized due to monopoly pricing.  Judge Posner has suggested 
another metric that is a refinement of the conventional deadweight loss analysis.  In this 
Article, we review the current deadweight loss analysis of the social cost of monopoly.  
Most prominently we suggest three reasons to reconsider this analysis.  First, the 
deadweight loss analysis uses the sum of consumer and producer surplus to give an 
approximate measure of gains and losses without giving any consideration to the 
consumers’ relative utility levels.  Second, the analysis relies on the questionable 
assumption of profit-maximizing firms, not taking into consideration that where the shares 
of firms are widely-held—as is the case with most firms that have monopoly—managers 
may be motivated by goals other than profit maximization.  Third, the analysis is 
problematic to the extent that it ignores the social cost of inducing perfect competition in a 
given industry, and thus assumes a counterfactual that is not attainable even by a 
benevolent social planner.   
 As an alternative approach to analyzing the social cost of monopoly, we propose an 
applied general equilibrium model.  The index of social cost we use is the coefficient of 
resource utilization introduced by Gerard Debreu.8  This measure provides an exact, 
ordinal measure of the economic cost of monopolization in terms of wasted real resources. 
We take as benchmark a Pareto optimal state of economy that provides the same level of 
consumer satisfaction as achieved in the monopolized state.9  The primary objective of 
antitrust policy is to promote consumer welfare and efficiency, and Pareto optimality 
embodies both of these objectives.  To this extent, we suggest that marginal cost pricing 
should be viewed not only as a consequence of perfect competition but also as a necessary 
condition for achieving Pareto optimality.10 
 The rest of this Article is divided into several Parts. Part II is a review of the 
current analysis of the social cost of monopoly based on the deadweight loss triangle. In 
Part III, we discuss how the notion of Pareto optimality as the benchmark state of the 
economy can lead to a more appropriate measure of the cost.  In Part IV, we formalize the 
social cost analysis using a two-sector model and illustrate how to compute the coefficient 
of resource utilization. In Part V, we derive a family of linear inequalities, where the 
unknown variables are utility levels and marginal utilities of income of households and the 
marginal costs of firms. These inequalities suffice for an empirical determination of 
monopoly power in a series of historical observations of market data, and this methodology 
can be used by courts in applying the Grinnell test. 
  
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 See Gerard Debru, The Coefficient of Resource Utilization, 19 ECONOMETRICA 273 (1951). 
9 See infra Section III.A. Ultimately, our methodology can be used to calculate the snap-shot social cost in 
terms of the dollar values in relation to an attainable counterfactual. 
10 See infra Part III. Whenever this condition is violated in a sequence of observed equilibria we can calculate 
the social cost in each observation via Debreu’s coefficient of resource allocation. See infra Section III.B. 
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 II.  RECONSIDERING THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS AS THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY 
 
 By now, most economists agree as to the nature of the problem posed by monopoly 
and market power.  A monopolist who cannot price-discriminate has an incentive to 
reduce output and charge a price higher than marginal cost, and in turn, prevent transactions 
that would have been mutually beneficial.  Faced with monopoly pricing, consumers 
either pay higher than necessary prices to obtain their goods or must choose false 
alternatives—alternatives that appear to be cheaper even though they might require more 
resources to produce.11  Put differently, monopoly is inefficient because in preventing 
such transactions, society uses up more resources than necessary to achieve given levels of 
utility among consumers.12  Although destruction of mutually beneficial transactions is 
patently inefficient from society’s perspective, it remains unclear what is the proper metric 
to measure the social cost of monopoly.  Intuition tells us that, whatever the metric is, it 
should indicate the extent to which the current state of monopolized economy deviates from 
an efficient state of economy that could have been achieved if resources were better 
allocated. In traditional textbook microeconomics, the social cost of monopoly is measured 
by the deadweight loss triangle.   
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>> 
 
Triangle A in Figure 1 depicts this loss since this area represents the amount of additional 
social surplus that could have been realized had the pricing been at marginal cost.  
Alternatively, taking potential rent-seeking behavior among firms into consideration, Judge 
Posner argues that in certain markets where firms compete to become a monopoly, the 
social cost should include producer surplus in addition to the deadweight loss.13  In Figure 
1, this quantity is represented as the sum of A and B.  Despite capturing the essence of the 
inefficiency of monopoly, the social cost metrics such as these, which are based on the 
conventional deadweight loss triangle, are inappropriate because they require some 
                                                 
11 This point has long been recognized. A.P. Lerner in a landmark article writes that “[I]ncreasing the price of 
the monopolized commodity [causes] buyers to divert their expenditure to other, less satisfactory, purchases. 
This constitutes a loss to the consumer which is not balanced by any gain reaped by the monopolist, so that 
there is a net social loss.” A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 
REV. OF ECON. STUD. 157 (1937). 
12 The foregoing analysis is the “resource allocation” aspect of monopoly. See Arnold C. Harberger, 
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AMER. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 77 (1954). Clearly, there is also a 
distribution effect: monopoly pricing tends to redistribute income in favor of the monopolist. But insofar as 
these are mere transfers, antitrust economists do not regard them as socially inefficient. See, e.g., Lerner, 
supra note 11, at 157 (“A levy which involves a mere transference to buyer to monopolist cannot be said to be 
harmful from a social point of view unless it can be shown that the monopolist is less deserving of the levy 
than the people who have to pay it . . . .”); POSNER, supra note 5, at 13 & 24.   
13 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 
(1975). To formalize this idea, Posner sets forth three conditions that need to be satisfied for this assertion to 
hold: (1) firms compete to obtain a monopoly; (2) firms face a perfectly elastic long-run supply of all input; 
and (3) the costs the firms spend in attempting to obtain the monopoly serve no socially useful purposes. Id. at 




First, these measures of social cost and surplus use the money metric: all benefits 
and inefficiencies are quantified in terms of dollars.  How should we understand the 
relationship between the money metric and social surplus?  Suppose Abigail is willing to 
pay as much as $5 for a widget, and Brian, $4, but a widget only costs $2.  Then after 
purchasing a widget, Abigail is left with $3 to spare, and Brian, $2.  They can devote their 
remaining dollars towards consumption of other goods.  But to add these values together 
and say $5 is the measure of social welfare does not really tell us what benefit each of them 
could have derived from additional consumption; little information is revealed about 
consumer welfare.  In order for this surplus measure to truly represent the social loss, we 
would need “the heroic assumption that a dollar is worth the same to everybody.”14  This 
notion of maximizing social surplus is related to the notion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but 
only loosely so since we are using dollar values as a proxy to measure social welfare.  
There may be instances where the only feasible and testable solution is to quantify all 
benefits and costs in terms of dollars. The cost-benefit analysis commonly used in health 
and safety regulation is one example.  But the cost-benefit analysis paradigm, too, has 
been criticized on many grounds, not the least of which is the validity of this “heroic 
assumption.”  
 A second failing of the deadweight loss analysis is that it relies on the concept of a 
profit-maximizing monopolist who produces goods until marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue.  Let us forget for the moment that this directive may be extremely hard to carry 
out in reality due to imperfect information.  What is somewhat striking is that even with 
perfect information, the profit-maximizing condition often fails to describe accurately 
actual behaviors of monopolists.  The literature provides several reasons why a 
monopolist might not consciously seek to maximize profit.  First of all, rarely do we see 
any prominent monopolist firm that has a sole owner or a sole shareholder.  Instead, most 
monopolist firms have multiple shareholders; and in many cases, these firms’ shares are 
widely held.  Investment and cost decisions of a firm are ultimately made by the managers 
of the firm who receive salaries and bonuses but are not necessarily owners.  These 
managers may neglect to maximize profits if that is not in their own best interest to do so.  
This could be the case, for instance, if managers were allowed to reap personal profits at the 
expense of corporate well-being; insider-trading is one example. The literature of industrial 
organization and microeconomic theory is replete with sources of inefficiency in principal-
agent models.  Fortunately, corporate law provides several institutional safeguards to 
minimize this type of opportunities for managers.  Insider trading and false financial 
reporting are illegal under the Rules 16, 10(b), and 10(b)-5 of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934.15  Managers and directors owe a duty of loyalty to their shareholders and 
cannot benefit themselves at expense of corporation.  The corporate opportunity doctrine 
precludes directors from taking a business opportunity for their own when the opportunity 
is within the firm’s line of business and the firm can afford to exploit the opportunity.  
                                                 
14 POSNER, supra note 5, at 23. In the jargon of economic theory consumer surplus only measures changes in 
consumers’ welfare if the marginal utility of income is the same for every household, rich and poor alike. 
15 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
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And importantly, a majority of shareholders can vote out the incumbent management in 
case they are dissatisfied with the firm’s performance. 
 But more importantly, even if shareholders and corporate law can create incentive 
schemes for managers to induce them to do what is best for the shareholders, managers 
would maximize profits only if that is in the best interest of shareholders.  Shareholders 
come in various types, and for many, the firm’s profit-maximization can run afoul of their 
best interest.16  Specifically, if a shareholder happens also to be a consumer of the firm’s 
output, then she will suffer by paying high prices for the firm’s output.  Second, a 
shareholder who sells factor inputs to the firm would stand to lose if the firm uses its 
market power to drive down the price for the factor she sells.  Third, a shareholder who 
owns a diversified portfolio may be hurt if the firm uses its market power to hurt its 
competitors.  Finally, even if the shareholder has no interaction with any of the firm’s 
output, she may be hurt if she consumes a good that is complementary to the firm’s output, 
since the firm’s pricing policy will necessarily impact the demand curves for 
complementary goods.   
 Non-economic arguments may also play a role, as “[w]hen the monopolist is not 
working on purely business principles, but for social, philanthropic or conventional 
reasons” or more likely “when the monopolist is working on purely business principles, but 
keeps the price and his profits lower than they might be so as to avoid political 
opposition.”17 Although the notion that a monopolist maximizes profit has some intuitive 
appeal, it may nevertheless run counter to the shareholder’s best interests, and thus will not 
always be pursued.  In actuality, a monopolist’s behavior is more likely to resemble that of 
cost-minimization, rather than of profit-maximization.  If monopolists do not obey the 
profit-maximizing conditions in practice, then the social cost of monopoly certainly should 
not be measured on the assumption that they do.   
 Our third and most important point is that the social cost of monopoly as measured 
by deadweight loss is problematic to the extent that it implicitly assumes that the relevant 
benchmark of efficiency—the counterfactual against which we measure the social loss—is 
the state of perfect competition.  The rationale is that under perfect competition price will 
equal marginal cost, and a willing buyer and a willing seller will engage in transactions 
without wasting any resources.  Nevertheless, the assumption of perfect competition as the 
ultimate benchmark is less innocuous than it appears.  Perfect competition requires 
atomism of firms and buyers.  But the literature is often silent as to exactly where these 
“other” firms suddenly come from.  It is unlikely that there are these firms idly sitting 
around and not producing any socially usefully goods but waiting to enter this market.  A 
more likely scenario is that firms or individuals somewhere have to cease their existing, 
socially useful activities in order to enter a particular industry.  For this reason, the perfect 
competition benchmark unrealistically assumes a sudden costless creation of countless new 
firms while everything else in society remains unchanged.  More generally, as A.P. Lerner 
                                                 
16 This argument is only cursorily included in this section. For a more detailed treatment, see DAVID M. 
KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 726-29 (1990). As a result, Kreps concludes that the notion of 
profit-maximizing firm is more applicable to price-taking firms without market power. Id. at 729. 
17 Lerner, supra note 11, at 170. 
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articulates, “[t]he direct comparison of monopolistic with competitive equilibrium . . . 
assumes that cost conditions are the same and that demand conditions are the same. Neither 
of these is likely, and the combination of both is much less likely.”18  
 We can illustrate the last point with a stylized example.  Suppose we have a 
competitive market for widgets.  But one day one of the widget-manufacturing firms, Firm 
A, patents a new formula to make “twidgets”—a new beneficial invention otherwise 
unrelated to widgets but a more profitable venture—out of the resources and technologies 
originally used to produce widgets.  Twidgets become an instant hit in the market, but for 
the first twenty years, Firm A enjoys monopoly due to the patent right.  We have a 
government-sanctioned inefficiency in this case.  As the patent expires, other widgets 
companies will rush into the twidget market, consumers can then buy twidgets at marginal 
cost and the deadweight cost from the widget monopoly is extinguished.  Notice, however, 
that the widget market will likely suffer now because widget firms are expending their 
resources to producing twidgets.  In other words, in order to induce perfect competition in 
one industry that was originally monopolistic, one would have to pull out resources from 
other industries.  The supply curve will, then, shift inward in one or more of other 
industries, and the new resource allocation reduces the social surplus generated from those 
industries.   
 Figures 2a and 2b demonstrate this example.  Figure 2a represents the twidget 
market, and Triangle ABC measures the gain in social surplus due to competition in the 
twidget market.  Meanwhile, Figure 2b refers to the competitive widget market and the 
counterfactual when the twidget patent expires.  Area represented by EFGH measures the 
reduction in social surplus due to the inward shift of the supply curve in the widget market.  
A more accurate measure of the social cost, therefore, would have to consider the totality of 
circumstances; the gain ABC would have to be measured against the loss EFGH.  All of 
sudden, it is not at all obvious that eliminating deadweight loss by inducing perfect 
competition in the twidget industry is particularly desirable; the result may be overall 
reduction in social surplus.  
 
<<INSERT FIGURES 2a AND 2b HERE>> 
 
 An economic analysis which focuses on the social surplus of one sector without 
considering possible implications for other sectors is called partial equilibrium analysis.  
Partial equilibrium analysis remains a powerful methodology for analyzing the behavior of 
firms in an isolated market where the impact on prices in other markets is negligible.  And 
yet this is hardly the case with interesting instances of monopoly power, e.g., AT&T, IBM, 
and Microsoft.  In all of these cases, prices were affected well beyond the immediate 
markets, and the static one-sector model cannot correctly estimate the social cost of 
monopoly.  At a minimum, we must consider the effect of inducing perfect competition in 
one industry on a different industry from which resources are drawn; a proper model thus 
                                                 
18 Lerner, supra note 11, at 161. Lerner is making one additional observation that the long-run cost curve 




would have to consider at least two separate sectors with common factors (which can be, 
broadly speaking, capital and labor).  What is more, since inducing perfect competition in 
and of itself may not be desirable on the whole, we must also consider other states of the 
economy that are potentially superior. 
 
 III. CONSUMER WELFARE, PARETO OPTIMALITY AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
THEORY 
  
 In general equilibrium theory, consumers simultaneously provide labor and capital 
to firms, own shares of the firms, and maximize their utility based on consumption subject 
to their income constraints; meanwhile, firms from different sectors produce different 
goods but use common factor inputs, labor and capital.  Notwithstanding the seemingly 
all-encompassing features of general equilibrium theory, its application to antitrust policy 
and the social cost of monopoly has been remarkably limited to date.19  In this Part, we 
briefly discuss the elements of general equilibrium theory and propose an alternative 
method of measuring the social cost of monopoly power—one not subject to the concerns 
raised above but nonetheless consistent with the aims of antitrust law.  
 We stress that a reasonable measure of the social cost of monopoly should be based 
on a proper counterfactual.  If perfect competition is inappropriate as a counterfactual, 
then what should be the ideal state of the economy against which to measure the social cost 
of monopoly?  We propose that the benchmark of comparison for the purpose of 
measuring the social cost of monopoly should be a counterfactual state that achieves the 
same or greater level of utility for everyone but with the least amount of resources.  If 
such a state can be constructed, then the economic cost of monopoly is simply the dollar 
amount of wasted resources; the given monopolized state performs no better than the 
counterfactual for any individual but simply uses up more resources.  
 The proposal merits some explanation.  The notion of efficiency and welfare in 
general equilibrium theory is Pareto optimality, also known as allocative efficiency.20  A 
state of the economy is said to be Pareto optimal if no consumer can be made better off by 
reallocating productive resources and engaging in mutually beneficial trades without 
making another consumer worse off; Pareto optimality thus represents a state of maximal 
consumer welfare.  The crown jewels of general equilibrium theory are the two welfare 
theorems.  The first welfare theorem states that every competitive equilibrium—i.e., 
equilibrium achieved under perfect competition—is Pareto optimal.21  In short, we tend to 
“value competition because it promotes efficiency, that is, as a means rather than as an 
                                                 
19 The conspicuous absence of application of general equilibrium theory to antitrust law is due in part to the 
indeterminacy of the price level in the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. As such, the model does not 
admit price-setting, profit-maximizing firms. 
20 The literature appears to use these terms interchangeably. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGIN 8-9 (2000)(describing allocative efficiency as the 
state in which “there [is] no combination of production or exchange that could make anyone better off without 
making someone else worse off.”). 
21 For an excellent treatment of general equilibrium theory, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 511-786 (1995). For the First Welfare Theorem in particular, see id. at 549. 
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end.”22   
 The primary goals of antitrust policy are efficiency and the enhancement of 
consumer welfare.23  Both of these concepts appeal to Pareto optimality.  Robert Bork 
“[insisted] that the achievement of Pareto optimality was the sole objective of Congress (as 
long as 1890) when it enacted the nation’s antitrust statutes.”24  Similarly, President 
Reagan’s first Council of Economic Advisers specifically defined efficiency in an economy 
in terms of Pareto optimality, not Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.25  Curiously, this nexus 
between Pareto optimality and antitrust law has been all but overlooked in the economics 
literature due to the singular focus on the deadweight loss analysis.26  Our analysis 
restores this nexus and suggests that the proper benchmark for measuring the cost of 
monopoly should be a Pareto optimal state of the economy, not simply competitive markets.  
A correct social cost metric should therefore reflect both the degree of deviation from a 
Pareto optimal state of the economy and the dollar amounts wasted.   
 But an economy can have possibly infinitely many Pareto optimal allocations, and 
we have not yet specified which of the many possible Pareto optimal states we should take 
as the relevant benchmark.  We propose the unique Pareto optimal state characterized by 
Debreu’s coefficient of resource utilization, ρ.  This coefficient is the smallest fraction of 
total resources capable of providing consumers with utility levels at least as great as those 
attained in the monopolized economic state. 27  Hence the efficiency loss in real terms is 
(1 - ρ) × total resources; the economy can throw away (1 - ρ) × total resources and not 
make anyone worse off.28   For example, suppose Abigail has ten apples, Brian has ten 
                                                 
22 POSNER, supra note 5, at 28. In addition, Lerner notes that the “importance of the competitive position lies 
in its implications of being . . . the position in which the ‘Invisible Hand’ has exerted its beneficial influences 
to the utmost.” Lerner, supra note 11, at 162. 
23 William F. Baxter, the first antitrust chief during the Reagan Administration, says “the antitrust laws are a 
‘consumer welfare prescription’—that is, they are intended to promote economic efficiency, broadly defined.” 
Likewise, Bork insists that the “only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of 
consumer welfare . . . .” See Walter Adams et al., Pareto Optimality and Antitrust Policy: The Old Chicago 
and the New Learning, 58 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 6 (1991). Modern courts also appear to understand the aim 
of antitrust law as enhancement of consumer welfare. Case law suggests that courts by way of antitrust law 
have shifted their focus from promoting competition to maximizing consumer welfare. See HYLTON, supra 
note 3, at 40.  
24 Id. at 5. 
25 According to the Council, an economy “is said to be ‘efficient’ if it is impossible to make anyone better off 
without making someone else worse off.  That is, there is no possible rearrangement of resources, in either 
production or consumption, which could improve anyone’s position without simultaneously harming some 
other person.” See id. 
26 However, one of the few analyses that link monopoly and Pareto optimality was given by A.P. Lerner as 
early as 1937. See Lerner, supra note 11, at 162. 
27 Debreu analyzes economic loss associated with nonoptimal economic states and identifies three kinds of 
inefficiencies in economic systems. Only one need concern us here: “imperfection of economic organization 
such as monopolies or indirect taxation or a system of tariffs.” Debru, supra note 8, at 289. To measure the 
economic loss, he posits a cost-minimization problem dual to Pareto’s maximization of social welfare. 
28 An attentive reader might reason that this measure actually offers a lower bound of the social cost since 
applying the same ρ across all resources is constraining. Indeed, if we can determine the minimum level of 
resources necessary to achieve the same utility level without imposing the same proportion of reduction 
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pears, and although each would prefer a mixed bundle of pears and apples, they are 
prohibited from trading for some reason.  If Abigail is indifferent between having ten 
apples and having a bundle of two apples and four pairs, and Brian between ten pears and a 
bundle with five apples and three pears, then the current state of economy is no better off 
than one that could be achieved with only seven apples and seven pears.  Thus society is 
squandering three apples and three pears, as they add nothing to consumer welfare.  If no 
smaller bundle can achieve the same level of consumer welfare as the current state of 
economy, then the coefficient of resource utilization in this case is 0.7.  
 Importantly, the fact that we choose ρ to be the minimal coefficient renders the 
new state of the economy—in which nobody is worse off than in the monopolized state 
Pareto optimal relative to the reduced resource endowment.29  Recall our discussion 
earlier that the inefficiency of monopoly could be viewed as using up more than necessary 
amounts of resources to achieve a particular utility level.  Then the natural benchmark for 
a monopolized economy is the Pareto optimal economic state that uses the least amount of 
resources but produces the same or higher level of consumer satisfaction; specifically, 
society’s endowment in the new state will be exactly ρ × total resources.  The associated 
economic cost indicates the inefficiency due to monopolization and can be converted into a 
dollar amount.  
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE>> 
 
 This cost is indicated in Figure 3.30  The original production possibility frontier 
(“PPF”) can be thought of as a social budget constraint.  α1 is the given state of economy, 
and α2 is an alternative state that lies on the community indifference curve and is tangent to 
the counterfactual PPF.  The counterfactual PPF represents the PPF produced with 
“minimal” social resources and yet is tangent to the community indifference curve, 
meaning every individual in the community is indifferent between the current state and the 
counterfactual state. 
 Of course, this notion of economic cost would have meaning only insofar as the 
relevant benchmark is actually achievable.  After all, one of the reasons for which we are 
not satisfied with the deadweight loss triangle as the measure of the cost of monopoly was 
that the counterfactual was not an achievable state of economy.  This is where the second 
                                                                                                                                                     
across all resources, the measure of social cost might be greater. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that such 
minimum bundle of resources is uniquely determined .The coefficient of resource utilization provides the 
benefit that such a level necessarily exists and is uniquely determined. 
29 The proof is by contradiction, and we include only a sketch here. Assume every consumer’ utility strictly 
increases, however small amount, with a positive change in any one of their goods. If the new economy were 
not Pareto optimal with respect to the reduced endowment, then the reduced endowment can be reallocated so 
as to increase at least one consumer’s utility by a positive measure. Then we can take some of this consumer’s 
endowments away from him and distribute them across everybody so as to increase everyone’s utility by a 
positive measure. By continuity we can find a way to distribute so that everyone’s utility returns to the normal 
level or remains slightly higher when everyone’s endowment is systematically reduced by a fraction close to 
but less than 1, say β. This violates the minimality of ρ, since βρ < ρ. 
30 We thank T.N. Srinivasan for suggesting this diagram. 
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welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory comes in, which tells us that every Pareto 
optimal economic state can be realized as a competitive equilibrium with lump sum 
transfers of income between households.31  As a result, using only ρ × total resources and 
with lump sum transfers, society can achieve the desired Pareto optimal state. Hence a 
benevolent social planner with perfect information could achieve our counterfactual while 
he cannot achieve the perfect competition benchmark.  In addition, the resulting measure 
of social cost provides the added benefit of assuming only ordinal measures of utility.  We 
need no longer assume either that a dollar is worth the same to everyone or that utility 
functions can be aggregated across consumers.  Adding up the cost of resources too makes 
sense with this framework since we are not equating these economic costs with gains or 
losses in individual utility levels.  Our task thus reduces to estimating ρ and the amount of 
resources wasted in a given monopoly state. 
 Before we go on, we want to make an important observation.  Our exclusive focus 
on Pareto optimality seems to ignore the welfare of the producers, and this may appear to 
be inconsistent with the original concern for social surplus, which includes both consumer 
surplus and producer surplus.  Not so.  If one were to make an analogy at all, general 
equilibrium theory’s notion of Pareto optimality should be compared with partial 
equilibrium theory’s notion of social surplus, not consumer surplus.  This is because in 
general equilibrium theory, consumers own the firms, and thus the firm’s profits are 
distributed back to the consumers according to their shares of ownership.  Firm decisions 
are made so as to maximize the welfare of consumer-shareholders, and there are no 
personas associated with the producers.  
 
 IV.  A TWO-SECTOR MODEL AND COST-MINIMIZING EQUILIBRIA 
 
 We now formalize our idea and illustrate the computation of ρ with a two-sector 
general equilibrium model.32  By now, we hope the motivation for having a two-sector 
model is clear to the readers: if the cost of monopoly in an industry can only be analyzed in 
relation to another industry that shares same factor inputs, a proper analysis of the social 
cost must include at least two sectors.  While our model can be generalized to 
accommodate multiple sectors, we only really need two sectors in order to convey the main 
ideas effectively.  There are two consumers, two commodities, two firms, and two factors 
of production. 33   We make the standard assumptions from microeconomic theory.  
                                                 
31 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 21, at 551-58. 
32 We formulate our model following John B. Shoven and John Whalley’s work. See generally JOHN B. 
SHOVEN & JOHN WHALLEY, APPLYING GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (1992). The relevant parts are Sections 3.2 and 
3.3, and also Chapter 6, where the authors include Arnold Harberger’s two-sector general equilibrium analysis 
of capital taxation. This model can easily extend to three or more sectors. 
33 This model is widely used in the applied fields of international trade and taxation where the focus is on 
general equilibrium comparative statics for policy evaluation. Also the data available such as national 
accounts and input-output data are easily accommodated in a two-sector model. For readers unfamiliar with 
the properties of the two-sector model, we recommend SHOVEN & WHALLEY, supra note 32. Here we follow 
the notation in Donald J. Brown & Geoffrey M. Heal, Marginal vs.. Average Cost Pricing in the Presence of 
a Public Monopoly, AMER. ECON. REV. 189 (1983). 
 
 11
Consumers have smooth, concave monotone utility functions and endowments of capital 
and labor and shareholdings in firms; they maximize utility subject to their budget 
constraints and are price-takers in the product and factor markets.  Each firm produces a 
single output with a smooth monotone and strictly quasi-concave production function.  In 
equilibrium all markets clear. 
 Competitive firms maximize profits and are price-takers in both the product and 
competitive factor markets; they produce at minimum cost and price output at marginal cost. 
Most of general equilibrium theory conventionally assumes competitive markets in all 
sectors.34  In order to extend the paradigm to encompass the existence of monopoly power, 
we introduce a new notion of market equilibrium: firms with monopoly power have 
unspecified price-setting rules for output—where the price of output is a function of the 
level of the output35—but are assumed to be cost-minimizing price-takers in competitive 
factor markets.36  This means, for instance, that Microsoft may have monopoly power in 
the software market but it still needs to pay competitive wages for its employees.  
Meanwhile, in equilibrium they make supra-competitive profits since the monopoly price 
exceeds the marginal cost of production.  Our analysis derives from a subtle but important 
distinction between price-setting profit-maximization—which we rejected—and monopoly 
power, i.e. the power to raise price above the competitive level and make supra-competitive 
profits.37  Both OPEC and Microsoft have monopoly power under this definition and it 
seems reasonable to assume that both attempt to produce output at minimum cost.  But 
neither OPEC nor Microsoft appears to be setting prices to maximize monopoly profits.   
 We denote the two consumers as x and y. The inputs or factors are capital (K) and 
labor (L).  The outputs or goods are natural gas (G) and electricity (E).  Each consumer 
has a utility function denoted Ux and Uy.  Consumers are endowed with capital and labor, 
which they provide to firms in exchange for wages and rental rates; they also have shares in 
the ownership of the firm.  Endowments and shareholdings in firms for x and y are given 
by (Kx , Lx), (Ky , Ly); (θx G , θx E), (θy G , θy E).  Each firm has a production function, FG and 
FE.  Let K = Kx + Ky, and L = Lx + Ly.  Let PG and PE denote the prices of natural gas and 
electricity, and w and r denote the prices of labor and capital.  Consumers can freely trade 
goods with each other, but not their labor or capital endowment; firms can freely trade 
factor inputs.  We suppose that the gas market is competitive but the electricity market is 
monopolized.  Therefore PG = MCG, the marginal cost of producing gas, and gas is 
produced with constant returns to scale. 
                                                 
34 In fact, the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, with its indeterminate absolute price level, cannot 
accommodate price-setting, profit-maximizing firms. See Richard R. Cornwall, The Concept of General 
Equilirbium in a Market Economy with Imperfectly Competitive Producers, 29 METROECONOMETRICA 55 
(1977); Volker Bohm, The Foundation of the Theory of Monopolistic Competitive Revisited, 63 J. ECON. 
THEORY 208 (1994).   
35 See KREPS, supra note 16, at 726-29. 
36 “By pure monopoly is meant a case where one is confronted with a falling demand curve for the 
commodity one sells, but with a horizontal supply curve for the factors one has to buy for the production of 
the commodity; so that one sells as a monopolist but buys in a perfect market.” Lerner, supra note 11, at n.2. 
37 This latter definition is consistent with Lerner’s index. “If P = price and C = marginal cost, then the index 
of the degree of monopoly power is (P-C)/P.” Lerner, supra note 11, at 169. 
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 Let us consider how the economy operates.  Consumers consume electricity and 
gas to maximize their utility subject to their budget constraints.  They have several sources 
of income: wages from providing labor, interest rates on their capital investment, and 
dividends from the firms’ shares, which are determined by the firms’ profits.  Therefore, 
we write the consumer’s problem as follows: 
 
 Consumer’s Problem 
 
  max Ui (Ei, Gi)  subject to  PE Ei + PG Gi ≤ Ii   (1) 
  
 where Ii = wLi + rKi + θi G (PG G – wLG – rKG) + θi E(PE E – wLE – rKE) 
 and i = x, y. 
 
Since utility increases in Ei and Gi, the weak inequality ends up binding.  In addition, since 
the gas market is competitive, the third term in the income equation is zero.  Meanwhile, 
firms minimize their cost of production given their target levels of production.    
  
 Firm’s Problem 
 
  min wLj+rKj  subject to  Fj (Lj, Kj) = j, for j = E, G. (2) 
 
Notice that these target levels are not necessarily determined by profit-maximization 
motives.  For monopoly or any other market structure it matters not how the actual target 
levels are chosen; our methodology gives a measure of inefficiency based on the observable 
production levels the firms choose and market prices.   
Now we give our definition of cost-minimizing market equilibrium.   
 
 Definition. A cost-minimizing equilibrium is then defined as a set of relative prices 
PE/w, PG/w and r/w; consumer’s demands for goods Ex, Gx and Ey, Gy; firm’s demands for 
factors LE, KE and LG, KG; and output levels E and G such that (i) consumers maximize their 
utility levels given the prices of goods, (ii) firms make nonnegative profits and minimize 
their costs of production given the prices of factor inputs; and (iii) all markets clear.  That 
is, 
 
 Product Markets: EX + EY = E ; GX + GY = G   (3) 
  
Factor Markets:  LE + LG = L ; KE + KG = K   (4) 
  
Nonnegative Profits: PE E ≥ wLE + rKE ; PG G = wLG + rKG.  (5) 
 An important result from general equilibrium theory is the set of conditions 
necessary for Pareto optimality of the economy.38  We will first state them and explain 
                                                 
38 For the intuition and derivation of these necessary conditions, see generally Francis Bator, The Simple 
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intuitively why these conditions are necessary: 
 
    (i) MRSx = MRSy     (6) 
 
    (ii) MRTSE = MRTSG      (7) 
 
    (iii) MRSx = MRT = MCG /MCE .    (8) 
 
 To begin with, what can we say about a Pareto optimal state of the economy?  At 
an optimal state, consumption should be efficient in the sense that the consumers should not 
be able to trade their consumption goods with each other and achieve a Pareto improvement.  
In addition, production should be efficient in the sense that the firms should not be able to 
trade their factor inputs and achieve a Pareto improvement on society’s production levels.  
And finally, we also want to make sure the product-mix is efficient in the sense that society 
should not elect to produce a unit of gas instead of some additional amount of electricity if 
a consumer prefers more electricity to gas in his consumption.  The above conditions are 
simply abstractions of these intuitions. 
MRSx refers to the marginal rate of substitution of electricity for gas for x., and it 
represents the rate at which x is willing to give up electricity for gas, holding his utility 
constant.  This is also equal to the ratio of marginal utilities for each good: MUx,G / MUx,E.  
The first condition says that at optimum, x’s willing rate of substitution must equal that of 
y’s.  Let us see why this is true.  Without loss of generality, suppose that MRSx = 2 and 
MRSy = 1 at some point.  This state cannot be optimal.  x is willing to give up as much as 
2 units of electricity to obtain 1 unit of gas, and y is willing to make a one-to-one trade and 
still able to maintain her current utility level.  Then y can choose to trade one unit of her 
gas to extract two units of electricity from x.  This exchange will not change x’s utility but 
will increase y’s utility since y would have achieved the same level of utility with just one 
unit of electricity and now she ends up with one extra unit.  Since this is a strict 
improvement for y without hurting x, the new state is a Pareto improvement to the original 
state, contradicting our assumption that the current state is Pareto optimal.  Thus we must 
have MRSx = MRSy. 
 The second condition refers to the marginal rate of transformation, and the analysis 
is similar to the first one.  The marginal rate of technical substitution measures the rate at 
which the firm can replace one input, say labor, by the other, capital while maintaining the 
same production level.  If MRTSE = 2, this means, Firm E can produce the same amount of 
electricity while trading in two units of labor for one unit of capital.  It is then easy to see 
why we need MRTSE = MRTSG at optimum.  For example, if MRTSE = 2 and MRTSG = 1, 
then Firm E can maintain its current production level by taking one additional unit of 
capital and giving up two units of labor.  Since Firm G can trade at a one-to-one ratio and 
maintain its current level of production, Firm G can increase its production level by 
offering one unit of its capita to Firm E and receiving two units of labor.  This is an 
                                                                                                                                                     
Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AMER. ECON. REV. 22 (1957). 
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overall improvement to the current state, and thus it violates the optimal condition.  
Therefore, we must have MRTSE = MRTSG at optimum. 
 The third condition equates MRSx with MRT, the marginal rate of transformation.  
MRT represents how many units of electricity must be sacrificed in order for society 
produce gas; this incorporates the marginal costs of production for both.  That MRT 
should equal to the ratio of MCG and MCE  can be explained by the fact that is MCG the 
cost to society of producing one additional unit of gas (by expending some combination of 
labor and capital) and MCG the cost to society of producing one additional unit of electricity.  
A more interesting question is why MRSx should equal MRT.  If MRSx = 2 but MRT = 1, 
for example, that means x is willing to give up as much as 2 units of electricity to obtain 1 
unit of gas.  Since the costs to society are equal for production of gas and production of 
electricity at the margin, it would have been better to have forgone the production of the 
last unit of electricity and instead devote this resource to producing an additional unit of gas.  
This would have made x happier since his utility level would have been the same with 
giving up two units of electricity and obtaining one unit of gas, but with society’s alternate 
production plan he need only give up one unit of electricity and obtain one unit of gas.  
Therefore, we need MRSx = MRT.  Analogously, MRSy = MRT and in the end society’s 
marginal rate of transformation must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution for every 
consumer in the economy. 
 In addition to these necessary conditions, we derive a few more conditions from the 
consumers’ and the firms’ optimization problems.  The firm’s cost minimization problem 
relates the marginal rate of technology substitution with wages and rental rates.  As for the 
consumer’s problem, since the consumers make their consumption decisions based on the 
market prices, the first-order condition from the consumers’ problem tells us that:  
 
    MUx,G/ MUx,E = PG /PE    (9)  
 
Since MRSx = MUx,G/ MUx,E, if we combine (9) with (8), we have 
 
    PG /PE = MCG /MCE .    (10) 
 
And PG = MCG , since the market for gas is competitive.  Hence for Pareto optimality,39 
we must also have  
PE = MCE .    (11)   
 
It is in this sense that we should view marginal cost pricing not only as a result of perfect 
competition but also as a necessary condition for society to achieve Pareto optimality.   
 We now turn to the computation of ρ in this two-sector model.  Suppose the given 
economic state of the model is a cost minimizing market equilibrium where PE /PG ≠ MCE 
/MCG , and suppose in equilibrium x consumes (Êx , Ĝx) and y consumes (Êy , Ĝy).  ρ is the 
                                                 
39 Likewise, since consumers make decisions about how much labor and capital to offer to the firms based on 
wage and rental rates, the optimization condition from the firm’s problem dictates that the marginal rate of 
technical substation of capital for labor be equal to the ratio of w/r. 
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minimum α between 0 and 1 where the given two-sector model with reduced social 
endowments αK and αL can produce sufficient electricity Ĕ and natural gas Ğ such that: 
 
   Ux (Ĕ x , Ğ x) ≥ Ux (Êx , Ĝx)    (12) 
 
   Uy (Ĕ y , Ğ y) ≥ Uy (Êy , Ĝy)    (13) 
 
   Ĕ x + Ĕ y = Ĕ ; Ğ x + Ğ y = Ğ.    (14) 
 
   Ĕ = FE (LE , KE) ; Ğ = FG (LG , KG)    (15) 
 
   LE + LG = αL ; KE + KE = αK     (16) 
 
These equations and inequalities define the optimization problem for determining ρ and we 
can solve them using the Lagrange multiplier method.   
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE>> 
 
 We can illustrate this with Figure 4. The outputs (Ê, Ĝ) produced in a cost 
minimizing market equilibrium lie on the PPF, as a consequence of competitive factor 
markets and production at minimum cost.  α1 is the output (Ê, Ĝ) produced in the cost 
minimizing market equilibrium. α2 = (Ĕ, Ğ) and satisfies (12)-(16).  The social 
endowments used to produce α2 are ρK and ρL, where K and L are the original social 
endowments of capital and labor.  If the slope of the PPF is P*E /P*G , then ρ is the ratio GN 
/G0 and the economic cost is (1-ρ)[wL + rK].40  The existence of such α is guaranteed 
since solutions to (12)-(16) are guaranteed for α = 1 by virtue of the existing market 
allocations.  The uniqueness is also assured since we choose the minimal such α.  In 
practice, ρ must be estimated from market data, and in Part VI we show how this is done.   
A natural question at this point is how this dollar amount would compare to the 
dollar amount of the deadweight loss triangle.  As it turns out, there are no systematic 
relationships between these two figures.  The economic wastes from the applied general 
equilibrium model can be lower, higher, or equal to the dollars corresponding to the 
deadweight loss costs. 
Before we conclude this Part, we make a side remark.  We showed above that 
marginal cost pricing was a necessary condition for Pareto optimality.  Supra-competitive 
pricing, of course, is not the only instance where (11) is violated: firms practicing predatory 
pricing violate (11) also by artificially setting prices below marginal costs.  Thus, this 
perspective on marginal cost pricing illuminates an important aspect of predatory pricing: 
the harm in predatory pricing is that by selling goods at a price below marginal cost, the 
firm destroys Pareto optimality in society in much the same way monopoly pricing does.  
                                                 
40 This computation is given in Donald J. Brown & G.A. Wood, “the Social Cost of Monopoly,” COWLES 
FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER No. 1466 (2004). 
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This observation challenges the current approach towards predatory pricing in antitrust law 
established in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.41 Under this 
standard, an incumbent monopolist cannot be held liable for predatory pricing unless 
plaintiff can show not only that the monopolist priced goods below marginal cost but also 
that the monopolist had a reasonable prospect of recouping the incurred costs.  Judge 
Easterbrook reasoned in another case that “if there can be no ‘later’ in which recoupment 
could occur, the consumer is an unambiguous beneficiary even if the current price is less 
than the [marginal] cost of production.”42  Our model shows that a monopolist who 
practices predatory pricing incurs social cost even absent the prospect of driving out 
competition or the prospect of recouping the costs.  This symmetry between monopoly 
pricing and predatory pricing should not come as a surprise in light of the fact that 
predatory pricing, too, offers consumers false alternatives in terms of consumption goods, 
just as monopoly pricing does.  Due to the lowered pricing, consumers may elect to 
consume a particular good over another even though the consumed good may be more 
costly to produce. 
 
 V.  APPLICATION TO THE GRINNELL TEST 
 
 In this Part, we consider how we can implement our model to measure monopoly 
power.  One definition of monopoly power in the literature of antitrust economics is the 
existence of substantial market power for a significant period of time.  For cases involving 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, courts use the Grinnell test: the offender must have both “(1) 
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”43  The determination of the 
second element depends on the intent of the monopolist and will necessarily turn on the 
factual background of the case; the court will have to look at the business practice and 
exclusionary conduct.  The first element, however, is an empirical question and its 
determination must turn on the history of price and demand data over a period of time.  
That is, in order for the courts to apply the Grinnell test they must review a history of the 
alleged monopolist’s pricing behavior to ascertain the existence of monopoly power.  The 
difficulty with inference of monopoly power is that neither the cost curves nor the demand 
curves are generally known; market data only provide us with the equilibrium behaviors of 
consumers and firms.  Nonetheless we can combine some of the results from advanced 
microeconomic theory with our model to determine the existence of monopoly power.   
Let us consider how this would work and what it is that we want to find.  If a 
given industry is relatively competitive, then the price will be close to the marginal cost, the 
social cost from the firms’ behavior will be small and the resulting ρ will be close to 1.  If 
we can calculate ρ and find that it is significantly smaller than 1, then this is evidence that 
the market is not competitive, and we can infer monopoly power accordingly.  But in 
                                                 
41 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
42 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989). 
43 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
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order to calculate ρ, we must solve the minimization problem defined by Equations (12)-
(16) and we have neither the utility functions nor the firm’s production functions to work 
with.  Instead we only have a history of market data, which tells us how consumers’ 
behaviors44 have changed over time with firms’ varying prices and how firms’ production 
levels have changed over time with varying factor prices.  Since these data only provide us 
with the equilibrium behaviors, they are incomplete in that the utility functions of 
consumers and the production functions of firms are not observable. Microeconomic theory 
tells us how we can use observed equilibrium consumptions, factor demands of firms and 
market prices to approximate these functions from the equilibrium inequalities.  At this 
point we can solve the problem defined by (12)-(16) and impute the economic costs of 
monopolization in terms of Debreu’s coefficient of resource utilization.   
 The equilibrium inequalities consists of: the Afriat inequalities for each consumer; 
her budget constraint in each observation; Varian’s cost minimizing inequalities for each 
firm; the market clearing conditions for the goods and factor markets in each observation; 
and the nonnegative profit conditions for each firm in each observation.45  The Afriat 
inequalities follow from the Consumer’s Problem in (1) and consist of a finite number of 
linear inequalities derived from a finite number of observations on a consumer’s demands. 
Suppose we are given a history of demand pattern x1, x2,…, xn at market prices p1, p2,…, pn.  
Each xi is a bundle of goods at the household level, and each pi is a vector of prices.  We 
say that the Afriat inequalities are solvable if there exist a set of utility levels and marginal 
utilities of income for each observation, {(V1, λ1), . . . , (Vn, λn)}, such that given any pair of 
observations, i and j, we have 
 
  Vi ≤ Vj + λj pj ·(xi – xj)  and  Vj ≤ Vi + λi pi · (xj – xi).  (17) 
 
Afriat’s celebrated theorem46 is that if we can find the solutions to these Vi and λi, then we 
can find a concave, monotonic and continuous utility function U(x) such that U(xi) = Vi and 
rationalizes the data. 
                                                 
44 We assume these data are available at the household level. 
45 For discussions on Afriat’s and Varian’s inequalities, see S.N. Afriat, The Construction of Utility Function 
from Expenditure Data, 8 INT’L. ECON. REV. 67 (1967); Hal R. Varian, The Nonparametric Approach to 
Demand Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 945 (1982). 
46 A utility function U is said to rationalize the data {(p1, x1), . . . , (pn, xn)} if for all i, U(xi) ≥ U(x) for all x 
such that pi ·x ≤ pi ·xi. Afriat’s theorem is that the data is rationalized by a concave, monotonic and continuous 
utility function U if and only if the Afriat inequalities are solvable; and a rationalizing U can be constructed 
from each solution of the Afriat inequalities. For the derivation of Afriat’s inequalities, we use the Kuhn-
Tucker formulation of the F.O.C for utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, assuming that the 
utility function is strictly concave, monotone and the indifference curves do not cut the boundary of the 
positive orthant, e.g., Cobb-Douglas. Then the optimal x and Lagrange multiplier, λ, are a saddle-point of the 
Lagrangian (see Intrilligator`s text on Mathematical Economics). The Afriat inequalities are a trivial corollary 
of this fact.  The surprising part is the converse theorem, i.e. if the Afriat inequalities have a solution then 
there is a utility function that rationalizes the data, see the proof in Varian, supra note 45. For Varian`s cost-
minimizing inequalities it is the same argument, where the optimization problem is cost minimization subject 
to an output constraint. 
 
 18
 Varian’s cost minimizing inequalities use a similar concept.  They follow from 
the Firm’s Problem from (2) and consist of a finite number of linear inequalities derived 
from a finite number of observations on a firm’s outputs f1, f2, …, fn; factor demands: y1, y2, 
…, yn; and factor prices: q1, q2,…, qn.  Varian showed that if we can find a set of numbers, 
{β1, . . . , βn},47 such that given any pair of observations, i and j,we have 
 
  fi ≤ fj + βj qj · (yi – yj)  and  fj ≤ fi + βi qi · (yj – yi),  (18) 
 
then we can construct a continuous, monotonic, quasi-concave cost function such that the 
firm’s decisions are consistent with the cost-minimization problem.48 
 We can combine these results with our model to estimate ρ from market data. 
Given a history of observations on the two-sector model, the equilibrium inequalities are 
solvable linear inequalities in the utility levels and marginal utilities of households and the 
marginal costs of firms, for parameter values given by the observed market data—that is, 
market prices, factor endowments, consumption levels, and share holdings in firms—if and 
only if this is a history of cost minimizing market equilibria.  The solution determines a 
utility function for each household and a production function for each firm that is consistent 
with the market data in each observation.  Using these utility functions and production 
functions we can solve the minimization problem for ρ defined by equations (12)-(16). 
  
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this Article, we join with Robert Bork and William Baxter in proposing Pareto 
optimality as the embodiment of the goals of antitrust law.  As such, it implicitly defines 
the proper benchmark for assessing the social cost of monopoly as the Pareto optimal state 
that utilizes minimal economic resources to provide the same level of consumer satisfaction 
as realized in the monopolized state.  These wasted real resources provide a measure of 
the social cost of monopoly free from the vagaries of the social surplus measure used in 
conventional deadweight loss analysis of monopoly pricing, such as assuming a constant 
and equal marginal utility of income across consumers.  Our model uses applied general 
equilibrium theory, which allows for the effects of monopolization on multiple sectors in 
the economy, an empirical determination, in a series of historical observations, of 
allegations of monopoly power, as required by the Grinnell test, and a reappraisal of 
predatory pricing. 
                                                 
47 βi turns out to be the reciprocal of the marginal cost at each observation. 
48 A production function f is said to rationalize the data if for all i, fi (yi) = fi and fi (y) ≥ fi (yi) implies qii·y > 
qii·yi.  That is, y minimizes the cost over all bundles of factors that can produce at least fi. Varian’s theorem is 
that the cost minimizing inequalities are solvable if and only if there exists a continuous monotonic quasi-
concave, i.e., diminishing marginal rate of substitution along any isoquant, function that rationalizes the data. 
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Figure 4. The Social Cost of Monopoly
Economic Loss
in Wasted Real
Resources
